CRS Issue Briefs by Smith, Marcia S.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code IB92011
U.S. Space Programs:
 Civilian, Military, and Commercial
Updated October 21, 2004
Marcia S. Smith





U.S. Government Civilian Space Programs
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Human Spaceflight and Space Launch Vehicles
Science Programs




International Cooperation and Competition




Early Warning Satellites: the SBIRS/STSS Programs
Space-Based Lasers and Space-Based Kinetic Energy Weapons for Boost-Phase
Missile Defense
NFIRE
Antisatellite Weapons and Space Control
NRO, NIMA/NGA, and Imagery
Space-Based Radar
Developing New Space Launch Vehicles
Commercial Space and Trade Issues
International Relationships
LEGISLATION
For links to other current CRS reports on space activities, go to the CRS website
[http://www.crs.gov] and click on “Science” in the list of Current Legislative Issues.  Then
click on “U.S. Space Programs.”
IB92011 10-21-04
        Congressional Research Service    ˜    The Library of Congress
U.S. Space Programs:
 Civilian, Military, and Commercial
SUMMARY
The 108th Congress is addressing a broad
range of civilian, military, and commercial
space issues.
The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) conducts the most
visible space activities. NASA’s FY2005
budget request is $16.2 billion. NASA
requested $15.5 billion for FY2004; Congress
approved $15.4 billion.  The loss of the space
shuttle Columbia on February 1, 2003, and the
future of NASA’s human space flight activi-
ties is dominating debate about NASA.  On
January 14, 2004, President Bush announced
a new exploration initiative that involves
terminating the shuttle program in 2010 when
construction of the space station is completed,
building a new Crew Exploration Vehicle to
take astronauts to the Moon by 2020, and
redirecting U.S. research on the space station
to support the goal of returning humans to the
Moon and eventually sending them to Mars
and “world beyond.”
The Department of Defense (DOD) has
a less visible but equally substantial space
program.  Tracking the DOD space budget is
extremely difficult since space is not identi-
fied as a separate line item in the budget.
DOD sometimes releases only partial
information (omitting funding for classified
programs) or will suddenly release without
explanation new figures for prior years that
are quite different from what was previously
reported.  The most recent figures from DOD
show a total (classified and unclassified) space
budget of $19.4 billion for FY2003, $20
billion for FY2004, and a FY2005 request of
$21.7 billion.   DOD space programs receiving
special congressional attention include
SBIRS-High ( to develop a new early warning
satellite), Space Based Radar, and NFIRE (in
which a space-based “kinetic kill vehicle” may
impact a missile as it makes close sensor
observations of the missile’s plume).
The appropriate role of the government
in facilitating commercial space businesses is
an ongoing debate.  For many years, the focus
has been on commercial space launch ser-
vices, but commercial remote sensing satel-
lites also pose complex questions in terms of
encouraging the development of commercial
satellites that provide high quality data, while
protecting national security.  President Bush
signed a new commercial remote sensing
policy on April 25, 2003 that tries to strike a
balance between those objectives.
Space launch vehicles are similar to
ballistic missiles and concerns exist about the
potential transfer of certain space technologies
to countries intending to build missiles.  U.S.
linkage between space cooperation and adher-
ence to the Missile Technology Control Re-
gime was a significant factor in reaching
agreement on cooperative and commercial
space activities with Russia, and creates a
complex relationship with China depending
on the political relationship between China
and the United States.
International cooperation and competi-
tion in space are affected by the world eco-
nomic situation and the post-Cold War politi-
cal climate.  President Clinton’s 1993 decision
to merge NASA’s space station program with





The House Appropriations Committee’s version of the FY2005 VA-HUD-IA
appropriations bill (H.R. 5041, H.Rept. 108-674) cut NASA’s request from $16.2 billion to
$15.1 billion.  NASA’s FY2004 appropriation is $15.4 billion.  The committee cut funds
from several of the programs associated with a new exploration initiative (see CRS Report
RS21720) announced by President Bush in January.  The Senate Appropriations Committee
(S. 2825, S.Rept. 108-353) recommended $16.4 billion, including $800 million in emergency
spending ($500 million for the space shuttle and $300 million for a robotic servicing mission
to the Hubble Space Telescope).  The FY2005 Military Construction Appropriations and
Emergency Supplemental Hurricane Relief Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-324) includes $126
million for NASA for hurricane relief in connection with damage to its facilities at Kennedy
Space Center, FL.  The Senate Commerce Committee ordered reported a FY2005-2009
NASA authorization bill (S. 2541) that closely parallels the requested funding level.
DOD requested a total space budget of $21.7 billion in FY2005, compared with $20
billion in FY2004.   Among the topics of congressional interest are:  cost and schedule issues
with a new early warning satellite system, SBIRS-High; whether to embark on development
of a Space Based Radar system whose life cycle costs could be $25-30 billion or more; and
a scheduled satellite sensor mission, NFIRE, that may involve an impact between the sensor
and a missile.  The FY2005 DOD appropriations act was signed into law on August 5, 2004
(P.L. 108-287).   The FY2005 DOD authorization bill (H.R. 4200) is awaiting signature by
the President.  Actions on SBIRS-High, SBR, and NFIRE are described herein.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S. Government Civilian Space Programs
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
The establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in
the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-568, the “NASA Act”) symbolized
the entrance of the United States into the space age.  The Soviet Union had successfully
orbited the first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1, on October 4, 1957, lending the U.S. space
program a new urgency.  The first U.S. satellite, Explorer 1 (developed and launched by the
Army), was orbited on January 31, 1958 after several failures of the Naval Research
Laboratory’s Vanguard rocket.  President Eisenhower’s desire to separate military and
civilian space activities led to the “NASA Act” and the creation of the civilian NASA on
October 1, 1958, with the Department of Defense (DOD) retaining control over military
space programs.
Human Spaceflight and Space Launch Vehicles.  The Soviets achieved another
space “first” on April 12, 1961, when Yuri Gagarin became the first human to orbit Earth.
The United States responded by launching Alan Shepard into space on May 5, 1961, though
he made only a suborbital flight (the first American to orbit the earth was John Glenn in
February 1962), as part of the Mercury program.  Following Shepard’s flight, on May 25,
1961, President Kennedy announced that the United States intended to put a man on the
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Moon within a decade, initiating the Apollo program.  Following successful completion of
the Mercury and Gemini programs, NASA was ready to begin Apollo flights, but in January
1967, the first Apollo crew was killed when fire erupted in their Apollo command module
during a pre-launch test.  The first successful Apollo flight took place in 1968.  On July 20,
1969, Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin became the first humans to walk on the Moon as the
Apollo 11 spacecraft and pilot Michael Collins orbited overhead.  A total of six 2-man crews
(Apollo 11, 12, 14, 15, 16 and 17) walked on the Moon through December 1972.  Another
crew (Apollo 13) intended to do so, but instead made an emergency return to Earth when the
craft’s Service Module exploded enroute to the Moon.  Apollo was followed by the Skylab
space station (to which 3 crews were sent in 1973-1974) and the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz Test
Project in which a U.S. Apollo spacecraft with 3 astronauts and a Soviet Soyuz spacecraft
with 2 cosmonauts docked for two days of joint experiments.
In 1972, President Nixon approved NASA’s proposal to develop a reusable spacecraft
for taking crews and cargo into Earth orbit — the space shuttle.  The first shuttle flight
occurred in 1981 and NASA declared the system operational in 1982.  The Challenger
tragedy in January 1986 suspended shuttle operations for 32 months.  Flights resumed in
1988.  After 87 successful flights, on February 1, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia
disintegrated during its return to Earth (see CRS Report RS21408 and CRS Report
RS21606).  The space shuttle is currently grounded.  NASA hopes to resume flights in 2005.
The shuttle is NASA’s sole means of launching humans into space.  NASA, sometimes with
DOD, has been attempting since the 1980s to develop a replacement for it, expecting to
phase out the shuttle in 2012.  Those programs were not successful, however, and in
November 2002,  NASA announced that it would keep the shuttle operational at least until
2015, and perhaps until 2020 or longer.  However, President Bush’s January 2004 directive
calls for the space shuttle to be retired after space station construction is completed in 2010.
In 1984, President Reagan directed NASA to build a permanently occupied space
station.  The space station program has been very controversial since it began because of cost
and schedule issues.  Twenty-two attempts in Congress since 1991 to terminate the program
in NASA funding bills have failed.  In 1988, Europe, Canada and Japan agreed to be partners
with the United States in building the space station.  Redesigned and rescheduled repeatedly,
President Clinton called for yet another redesign in 1993 and later that year merged NASA’s
space station program with Russia’s.  That program, the International Space Station (ISS),
is currently underway (see CRS Issue Brief IB93017).  Construction is suspended until the
space shuttle returns to flight because the remaining segments are designed to be launched
on the shuttle.  Crews rotating on six-month schedules continue to live and work aboard the
station using Russian spacecraft for crew transport and cargo delivery.
In 1989, President George H.W. Bush announced bold goals for the human space flight
program, including returning humans to the Moon and sending them on to Mars.  That
program, the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI), was cancelled by Congress in 1992 largely
because of its expected high cost (initially estimated at $400-500 billion over 30 years).  On
January 15, 2004, President George W. Bush similarly announced new goals for NASA’s
human space flight program that involves returning humans to the Moon by 2020 and
someday sending them to Mars (discussed below).
Science Programs.   NASA has launched many spacecraft for space science and
earth science research.  Robotic probes served as pathfinders to the Moon for astronauts, and
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have visited all the planets in the solar system except Pluto, and a probe is scheduled to be
launched to that planet  in 2006.  Many of the probes have been quite successful, but there
were failures, too. In 1999, for example, two NASA Mars missions failed, at a combined cost
of $328.5 million.  They reflected NASA’s “faster, better, cheaper” (FBC) approach to
scientific spacecraft, replacing large, complex spacecraft that can acquire more information,
but take longer and cost more to build.  The FBC approach was subsequently scrutinized and
NASA restructured its Mars exploration program significantly.  Two NASA probes, Mars
Odyssey and Mars Global Surveyor, are now orbiting Mars, and twin rovers, Spirit and
Opportunity, are investigating the planet’s surface (a European probe, Mars Express, also is
orbiting Mars).   NASA also has sent, or plans to send, spacecraft to other planets, comets,
and asteroids.  These include Cassini, which arrived at Saturn on July 1, 2004 (GMT) after
a seven-year journey; and the Stardust probe that is on its way back to Earth after collecting
samples of a comet.  NASA’s Genesis spacecraft, which collected particles of the Sun for
return to Earth, was damaged when its parachute did not deploy, making a planned mid-air
capture impossible.  Genesis hit the ground at approximately 200 miles per hour.  NASA
reports that some of the samples survived the impact, and is optimistic that they were not
contaminated by the Earth’s environment and are still useable for scientific research.
Space-based observatories in Earth orbit have studied the universe since the 1960s,
creating new fields of astronomy since space-borne telescopes can intercept wavelengths
(such as x-rays and gamma rays) that cannot penetrate Earth’s atmosphere.  In the 1980s,
NASA embarked upon building four “Great Observatories” for studies in different parts of
the electromagnetic spectrum:  Hubble Space Telescope, launched April 1990 (primarily for
the visible wavelengths); Compton Gamma Ray Observatory, launched April 1991, deorbited
June 2000; Chandra X-Ray Observatory, launched July 1999; and the Spitzer Space
Telescope (formerly the Space Infrared Telescope Facility or SIRTF), launched August 2003.
NASA is planning the James Webb Space Telescope for further infrared observations.
Hubble was designed to be serviced and eventually returned to Earth by the space shuttle, but
NASA announced in January 2004 it would not send any more shuttles to Hubble because
of shuttle safety concerns (see CRS Report RS21767). 
NASA has solar-terrestrial physics programs that study the interaction between the Sun
and the Earth.  In FY2001, NASA began the Living with a Star program that envisions the
launch of many spacecraft over the next decade to obtain more accurate information on how
the Earth and society are affected by what has come to be known as “space weather” —
including, for example, negative effects of solar activity on telecommunications.
NASA also conducts research related to ensuring that humans can live and work safely
and effectively in space, and fundamental research that can be conducted in microgravity
environments, such as on the International Space Station.  In his January 2004 exploration
plan, President Bush directed that ISS research be limited to that supporting human
exploration of space, rather than the broadly-based research program that was planned.
During the 1960s and 1970s, NASA developed communications, meteorological, and
land and ocean remote sensing satellites.  NASA’s role in this aspect of space utilization
traditionally is R&D.  Once the technology is proven, operational responsibility is transferred
to other agencies or the private sector.  NASA continues to perform research in many of these
areas, however, particularly earth science (including global climate change).  NASA,
sometimes in partnership with other countries, has a variety of earth science probes in orbit
IB92011 10-21-04
CRS-4
today, including three large satellites (Terra, Aura, and Aqua) in the Earth Observing System
(EOS) program.
Other Civilian Government Agencies
Beginning in the 1960s, other civilian agencies became involved in space.  Operation
of weather satellites was transferred to what is now the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) in the Department of Commerce.  The Department of Commerce
is involved in other space issues due to its role in trade policy and export of items on the
Commerce Control List, and has an Office of Space Commercialization to facilitate
commercial space businesses.  In 1983, the Department of Transportation (DOT) was given
responsibility for facilitating and regulating commercial launch services companies.  This
function is performed through the Federal Aviation Administration.  DOT and DOD co-chair
a group that oversees use of DOD’s Global Positioning System of navigation satellites.  DOT
represents civilian users and has programs to augment the system’s utility to the civilian
community.  Other government agencies involved in space include the Department of
Energy, which develops nuclear power sources for spacecraft; the U.S. Geological Survey
in the Department of Interior which operates the Landsat satellites; the Departments of
Agriculture and other departments that use satellite data for crop forecasting and map
making, for example; and the Department of State, which develops international space policy
and determines whether to grant export licenses for items on the Munitions List.  The White
House’s National Security Council and Office of Science and Technology Policy are
involved in developing policy.
Commercial Space Programs
Civilian communications satellites have been chiefly a private sector activity since
passage of the 1962 Communications Satellite Act (P.L. 87-624).  Attempts to
commercialize other aspects of space activities have yielded mixed success.  Congress has
passed several laws to facilitate the commercialization of space launch services for putting
satellites into orbit (the 1984 Commercial Space Launch Act, the 1988 Commercial Space
Launch Act Amendments, and the 1998 Commercial Space Act).  The development of a U.S.
commercial  launch services industry has been largely successful.  DOD and NASA continue
to play a role in developing new launch vehicles, though some private companies are
developing their own.  The most controversial issues are the relative roles of the government
versus the private sector in developing new systems, ensuring that U.S. companies can
compete with foreign launch services companies, and trade and missile proliferation issues
involved in exporting satellites to other countries for launch. See CRS Issue Brief IB93062.
Congress also sought to facilitate commercialization of land remote sensing satellites
by privatizing the government’s Landsat program through the 1984 Land Remote Sensing
Commercialization Act ( P.L. 98-365).  Such satellites provide imagery of the Earth that can
be used for land-use planning, environmental studies, mineral exploration, and many other
purposes. After a tumultuous eight years that saw the effort to privatize Landsat fail,
Congress repealed that act and replaced it with the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992
(P.L. 102-555), bringing Landsat back under government sponsorship.  Landsat 5 and 7, built
and operated by the government, are now in orbit.  The act also promoted development of
new systems by the private sector.  Coupled with a 1994 Clinton Administration policy, these
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actions led several U.S. companies to initiate programs to build remote sensing satellites and
offer imagery on a commercial basis. Those companies must obtain an operating license from
NOAA for such systems.  Three U.S. companies (see below) currently have commercial
remote sensing satellites in orbit.   The market for their products is limited, however, and
they reportedly are struggling financially.  Partially in response to that concern, President
Bush signed a new commercial remote sensing policy on April 25, 2003 that is intended to
sustain and enhance the U.S. remote sensing industry. 
Controversy over the fact that the imagery has military as well as civilian uses
complicates this commercial space effort, however.  Though not as precise as military
reconnaissance satellites, the three operating U.S. private sector satellites, Ikonos 2 (Space
Imaging), QuickBird (DigitalGlobe), and Orbview 3 (Orbimage) produce imagery with
resolution (the ability to “see” an object or feature of a certain size) of 1 meter or less.
Competitors include French, Russian,  Indian, and Israeli companies that offer imagery with
2.5-meter, 1-meter, 1-meter, and 1.8-meter resolution respectively.  One major issue is when
the U.S. government can exercise  “shutter control,” forcing U.S. companies to discontinue
obtaining or distributing imagery of certain parts of the world in times of crisis.  DOD took
a different approach to controlling access to imagery when the United States initiated attacks
in Afghanistan.  For two months, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA, now
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency or NGA) bought exclusive rights to Ikonos
imagery of that area so that no one else could use the data without NIMA’s approval, a
practice dubbed “checkbook shutter control” in the media.  The government apparently did
not limit access to commercial satellite imagery during the 2003 Iraqi war.  Another issue is
the government’s role in controlling to whom the imagery is sold and which countries may
invest in the U.S.-owned systems.  U.S. companies want time limits on how long the
government can take to decide whether particular sales or investments will be permitted so
they can make wise business decisions.  The 2003 Bush policy states that the government
will provide a timely and responsive regulatory environment. 
Special issues have arisen regarding Israel.  On October 7, 1994, Senator Bingaman and
63 other Senators sent a letter to the Secretary of Commerce expressing concern that data
from Eyeglass (subsequently renamed Orbview) that could be used against Israel would be
made available to Saudi Arabia, which was providing partial financing for the system and
would be the location of a ground station.  The FY1997 DOD authorization bill (P.L.
104-201) prohibits collection and release, or U.S. government declassification, of satellite
imagery of Israel unless such imagery is no more detailed or precise than what is available
from commercial sources. 
Potential availability of commercial imagery also has a positive side for the military,
since the U.S. military and intelligence communities could reduce costs by acquiring imagery
commercially instead of building their own systems for some purposes.  Congress has
strongly encouraged NIMA (now NGA) to purchase commercial imagery to augment
classified imagery.  The 2003 Bush policy directs the U.S. government to utilize U.S.
commercial remote sensing space capabilities, for both civil and national security purposes,
to the maximum extent practicable.  Foreign commercial remote sensing space capabilities
may be used consistent with national security and foreign policy objectives.  (See below for
more on the use of commercial imagery by NIMA/NGA.)
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On June 21, 2004, Mike Melvill became the first person to reach space (on a suborbital
flight) aboard a privately funded launch vehicle, SpaceShipOne, designed by Scaled
Composites.  Mr. Melvill is sometimes referred as the first “commercial astronaut,” but
several representatives of commercial companies, and other private individuals, have flown
in space. Mr. Melvill’s flight is notable because SpaceShipOne was developed without
government funding, and some hope it will usher in an era of expanded space tourism.
Military Space Programs
The creation of NASA was a deliberate step by President Eisenhower to separate
military and civilian space activities.  Among other things, he wanted to stress that the United
States was interested in the peaceful uses of space, but recognized that space had military
applications as well.  The 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act specified that military
space activities be conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD).  The intelligence
community (coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence) makes significant use of
space-based intelligence collection capabilities, and participates in managing satellite
reconnaissance programs through the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), an agency
within DOD.  NRO builds and operates intelligence collection satellites, and collects and
processes the resulting data.  The data are provided to users such as the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA, formerly NIMA) and the National Security Agency (NSA).  The
Undersecretary of the Air Force is the Director of NRO, the  Air Force acquisition executive
for space, and DOD’s executive agent for space.
DOD and the intelligence community manage a broad array of space activities,
including launch vehicle development, communications satellites, navigation satellites (the
Global Positioning System — GPS), early warning satellites to alert the United States to
foreign missile launches, weather satellites,  reconnaissance satellites, and developing
capabilities to protect U.S. satellite systems and to deny the use of space to adversaries
(called “space control” or “counterspace systems”). The 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War is
dubbed by some as the first “space war” because support from space displayed great
improvement over what was available during the previous major conflict, Vietnam.  These
systems continue to play significant roles in U.S. military operations.
How to organize DOD and the intelligence community to work effectively on space
matters has been an issue for several years.  Congress established commissions to review the
NRO in the FY2000 intelligence authorization act, P.L. 106-120; NIMA in the classified
annex to the FY2000 DOD appropriations act, P.L. 106-79; and overall U.S. national security
space management and organization in the FY2000 DOD authorization act, P.L. 106-65.  The
NRO, NIMA, and “Rumsfeld Space Commission” reports are discussed below.
Although U.S. military and civilian space programs are separated organizationally, the
functions performed by satellites and the vehicles that launch them are not easily divided.
Both sectors use communications, navigation, weather, and remote sensing/reconnaissance
satellites, which may operate at different frequencies or have different capabilities, but have
similar technology.  The same launch vehicles can be used to launch any type of military,
civilian, or commercial satellite.  DOD uses some civilian satellites and vice versa.
DOD and NASA have both developed space launch vehicles, which are categorized as
either reusable launch vehicles (RLVs) or expendable launch vehicles (ELVs, which can only
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be used once).  An August 1994 Clinton Administration policy gave DOD responsibility for
maintaining and upgrading the ELV fleet, while NASA maintains the only RLV in use today
— the space shuttle — and has invested in new RLV technology.  (See CRS Issue Brief
IB93062 for more on launch vehicles.)
After the Cold War, interest in space weapons to attack satellites (antisatellite, or
ASAT, weapons) or ballistic missiles declined initially, but was rekindled beginning with the
104th Congress.  Using satellites to attack ballistic missiles has been controversial since
President Reagan’s 1983 announcement of a Strategic Defense Initiative to study the viability
of building a ballistic missile defense system to protect the United States and its allies. The
Clinton Administration changed the name of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to reflect a new focus on theater missile
defense in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, rather than national missile defense.  The Bush
Administration changed the name to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to reflect its
interest in broad missile defense goals (see CRS Report RL31111).  The concept of placing
weapons in space as part of a missile defense system remains controversial.  Whether missile
defense weapons ultimately are based in space or on the ground, a missile defense system
would require satellites for early warning, communications, and other functions. 
Interagency Coordination
Several mechanisms have been tried since 1958 to coordinate interagency space policy.
Dissatisfied with the Reagan Administration’s approach of using a Senior Interagency Group
(SIG/Space) under the National Security Council (NSC), in the FY1989 NASA authorization
act (P.L. 100-685), Congress re-created the National Space Council.  The original council,
which included aeronautics, was created in the 1958 Space Act, and abolished by President
Nixon in 1973.  Under President George H. W. Bush, the Space Council was headed by Vice
President Quayle.  President Clinton decided to merge the Space Council functions into a
National Science and Technology Council, administered through the Office of Science and
Technology Policy.  It oversaw civil and commercial space policy; while military space
activities were overseen by the National Security Council.  The Space Council still exists in
law, but it is not staffed or funded.  Some space advocates hoped President George W. Bush
would reactivate the Space Council, but a mechanism called a Policy Coordinating
Committee under the National Security Council (similar to SIG/Space) was chosen instead.
On July 28, 2002, in NSPD-15, President Bush directed the NSC to chair a review of
national space policies.  The first new policy, on commercial remote sensing, was signed
April 25, 2003.  On January 14, 2004, President Bush gave a major space policy address
where he laid out new exploration goals for NASA.  NASA and DOD also have a
“Partnership Council” to facilitate communication between their organizations and identify
areas for collaboration and cooperation.
International Cooperation and Competition
Virtually every country in the world uses satellites for communications and obtaining
weather data, but the usual measure of whether a country is a member of the “space-faring”
club is its ability to launch satellites.  By that criterion, Russia, the United States, China,
Japan, India, Israel, Ukraine, and the European Space Agency (ESA) are members.  ESA
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(in Billions of Unadjusted Dollars by Fiscal Year)
NASA & DOD Space Budgets 
Does not include transition quarter.  See text for other notes.
developed the Ariane launch vehicle; Ariane launches are conducted by the French company
Arianespace.  These countries, including many of the individual members of ESA, present
opportunities for cooperation, as well as competition.  The 15 members of ESA are Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
The NASA Act specifically states that NASA may conduct international space
activities.  Many NASA programs today have an international component. One of the major
cooperative projects today is the space station (see CRS Issue Brief IB93017).  European
countries, both individually and through ESA, Canada, and Japan, in particular, have
participated in many cooperative space programs with NASA.  They also compete with U.S.
companies in some space areas.  Europe, India, Ukraine, and Russia compete in launch
services for placing satellites into orbit.  France, Russia, India and Israel compete in satellite
remote sensing, and Europe competes in communications satellite manufacturing. n
Cooperation and competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union
attracted much attention.  Competition with the Soviet Union was measured less in economic
terms than in prestige and national defense.  The main area of competition today seems to
be on  the economic front, although Russian and Ukrainian companies have joint ventures
with U.S. firms to provide launch services, so economic cooperation also exists.
NASA and DOD Space Budgets
The majority of
U.S. government space
funding goes to NASA
and DOD.  This  table




FY2009.   The DOD
funding figures must be
u s e d  c a u t i o u s l y ,
however. Space is not a
line item in the DOD
budget, and DOD’s
a n n u a l  b u d g e t
justifications do not
include a figure for
“space activities.”
DOD sometimes releases only partial information or will release without explanation new
figures for prior years that are quite different from what was previously reported.  Space
spending by all federal government agencies, by year since FY1959, is provided in the annual
Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, submitted to Congress by NASA.  The most
recent edition of that report was released in 2002, covering through FY2000.    This table
uses data from that report for NASA and DOD through FY2000.   FY2001-FY2004
appropriations, and projections through FY2009, are from NASA’s annual budget
justifications, and from data supplied to CRS by DOD’s Office of the Comptroller.
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According to data provided in March 2004,  DOD’s space budget for FY2003 was $19.4
billion, for FY2004 is $20 billion, and the FY2005 request is $21.7 billion.  According to
NASA budget documents,  NASA received $15.3 billion in FY2003, $15.4 billion in
FY2004, and the FY2005 request is $16.2 billion.  All NASA figures include aeronautics
funding ($400 million-$1 billion annually in recent years).
Space Program Issues
NASA Issues
President Bush’s January 14, 2004 announcement of new space exploration goals is
capturing the spotlight of NASA issues in the FY2005 budget debate (see CRS Report
RS21720).  The President’s policy calls for redirecting NASA’s human exploration program
from low Earth orbit to the Moon, Mars, and “worlds beyond.”  Achieving that goal involves
both robotic and human missions. According to the President’s speech and a NASA
projected budget chart (the so-called “sand chart”) for FY2004-2020 that accompanied it
[http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/54873main_budget_chart_14jan04.pdf], humans would return to
the Moon in 2015-2020, and eventually go to Mars (no date given).  The space shuttle
program would be terminated in 2010, when space station construction is expected to be
completed, although the President asserted that the United States would meet its obligations
to the other partners in the program (see CRS Issue Brief IB93017).  U.S. space station
research would focus only on that which is needed to support extended stays by humans on
the Moon and eventual trips to Mars instead of the multi-disciplinary program that was
planned, and NASA would end its involvement in the space station program by FY2017
(although NASA Administrator O’Keefe subsequently stated there were no plans to “turn out
the lights”).  NASA would build a Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) whose primary purpose
is sending astronauts to the Moon, but could also be used to take them to the space station
by 2014.  U.S. astronauts would have to rely on Russia to take them to and from the space
station between 2010 and 2014.  The President invited other countries to join.  NASA
estimates that returning humans to the Moon by 2020 will cost $64 billion in 2003 dollars,
not including the cost of associated robotic missions.  A September 2004 Congressional
Budget Office report, A Budgetary Analysis of NASA’s New Vision for Space Exploration,
concluded that, based on historical NASA experience, that cost could be much higher
[http://www.cbo.gov]. NASA has not provided an estimate for sending astronauts to Mars.
The sand chart (cited above) suggests that approximately $150-170 billion would be spent
on the President’s initiative from FY2004-2020.  Most of this comes from redirecting funds
from other NASA programs (see CRS Report RS21720). 
The House and Senate Appropriations Committees expressed support for the President’s
initiative in their reports on the FY2005 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill (H.R. 5041/S.
2825), but cut requested funding (see CRS Report RS21744).  
Military Space Issues
For many years, questions have arisen about whether DOD effectively manages its space
activities, and several commissions and task forces have studied the issue.  Congress created
a commission in the FY2000 DOD authorization bill to make recommendations on the
overall management of national security space programs.  Chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, the
Commission released its report on January 11, 2001, shortly after Mr. Rumsfeld became
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Secretary of Defense.  The “Rumsfeld Space Commission”) made sweeping
recommendations for management of DOD and intelligence community space programs (see
CRS Report RS20824 for a synopsis).  According to two GAO reports (GAO-02-772, June
2002; GAO-03-379, April 2003), DOD intends to implement 10 of the 13 Rumsfeld Space
Commission organizational recommendations; by April 2003, nine had been implemented.
GAO added that was too early to assess the results of the organizational changes.  The
Defense Science Board (DSB) and Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (AFSAB)
commissioned a task force to review DOD space program acquisition because of significant
cost increases in several programs.  Chaired by retired Lockheed Martin executive Tom
Young, its May 2003 report was publicly released in September 2003
[http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/space.pdf].  Four key points are that cost has replaced
mission success as the primary driver in managing acquisition processes, creating excessive
technical and schedule risk; the space acquisition system is strongly biased to produce
unrealistically low cost estimates; government capabilities to lead and manage the acquisition
process have seriously eroded; and there are long term concerns about the space industrial
base.  According to press reports (e.g., Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2004, B7), the task
force produced an update in August 2004 that concluded that some of the space programs it
criticized were making progress but still required close review, and that better coordination
in needed between the military and intelligence agencies in setting requirements.
Meanwhile, DOD’s space budget is growing significantly — from $15.7 billion in
FY2002, to $20 billion in FY2004,  to a projected $28.7 billion in FY2008.  Some of that
will be needed to address increased funding requirements for existing DOD space programs
that are encountering technical and schedule challenges, but if the anticipated increases are
realized, new initiatives could be supported as well.  However, in its report on the FY2005
DOD appropriations bill (S. 2559, S.Rept. 108-284), the Senate Appropriations Committee
cautioned that funding for DOD’s space activities may not be sustainable.
Early Warning Satellites: the SBIRS/STSS Programs.  Among the most
prominent DOD space programs are efforts to develop new early warning satellites (see CRS
Report RS21148).  Briefly, DOD is attempting to develop more capable satellites to provide
early warning of foreign missile launches, and to support missile defense objectives.  The
Space Based InfraRed System (SBIRS) was proposed and approved in the FY1996 DOD
budget.  It evolved to envision satellites in both high orbits and low orbits.  The high orbit
system, SBIRS-High, is managed by the Air Force, and would replace existing Defense
Support Program satellites, with the primary goal of detecting missiles when they are
launched.  The low orbit system was called SBIRS-Low, but was renamed the Space
Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) in 2002.   STSS is managed by the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA), and would track missiles from launch to intercept or reentry; track
warheads deployed from the missiles; discriminate between warheads and decoys; and pass
data to other systems that would attempt to intercept and destroy the missiles or warheads.
SBIRS-High and STSS have each encountered technical challenges, schedule delays,
and cost increases.  Congress has expressed concern about the programs for several years,
and both programs have been restructured. For FY2004, DOD requested $617 million for
SBIRS-High research and development (R&D), plus $95 million for procurement of a
backup mission control station.  For STSS, DOD requested $300 million in FY2004.  In the
FY2004 DOD authorization act (P.L. 108-136), Congress approved full funding for both
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programs.  The FY2004 DOD appropriations act (P.L. 108-87) fully funds SBIRS-High and
cuts $15.5 million from STSS.
The May 2003 DSB/AFSAB report (discussed above) sharply criticized early program
management of SBIRS-High, and took a cautious attitude concerning whether the
restructured program would succeed.  An October 2003 GAO report (GAO-04-48) concluded
the program remains at “substantial risk of cost and schedule increases” despite the
restructuring.  The FY2005 request for SBIRS-High is $508 million for R&D (none for
procurement), and for STSS is $322 million.  In March 2004, Air Force Under Secretary
Peter Teets told Congress that he expected more cost problems on SBIRS-High. On June 17,
DOD notified Congress that SBIRS-High had breached a 15% “Nunn-McCurdy” cost growth
limit, which requires congressional notification.  (It breached a different Nunn-McCurdy
limit, 25% cost growth, in 2001, which required both notification and a certification that the
program met certain criteria to continue.  DOD made that certification and restructured the
program).   In the House, Senate, and conference versions of the FY2005 DOD authorization
bill (H.R. 4200), $35 million is added for SBIRS-High.  In the FY2005 DOD appropriations
act (P.L. 108-287), $91 million is added.  STSS appears to be fully funded.
Space-Based Lasers and Space-Based Kinetic Energy Weapons for
Boost-Phase Missile Defense.   Space-based lasers (SBL) and space-based kinetic
energy (KE) “hit-to-kill”weapons have been of interest in the context of missile defense since
President Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”) program in 1983.
Conceptually, these weapons would be able to attack missiles while they are still in their
boost phase (from launch until burnout), prior to when warheads or decoys are deployed.
Funding for research on SBL has waxed and waned over the years.  From 1995-2001,
Congress added funds to the DOD request for SBL ($50 million in FY1996, $70 million in
FY1997, $98 million in FY1998, and $74 million in FY1999). Congress directed DOD in
the FY1999 DOD authorization conference report to release promptly a request for proposals
(RFP) for a space based laser readiness demonstrator, although the Air Force Scientific
Advisory Board concluded that technology was not sufficiently advanced to proceed with it.
A Boeing-Lockheed Martin-TRW team jointly began work on the demonstrator, called the
Integrated Flight Experiment (IFX), and Congress approved $148.8 million for FY2000, and
$148 million for FY2001. 
 In FY2002, SBL was transferred from the Air Force to the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization (BMDO, now the Missile Defense Agency).  BMDO requested $165 million
for IFX, plus $5 million for SBL optics, but Congress cut $120 million in the FY2002 DOD
appropriations act (P.L. 107-117), effectively killing IFX. Funding for technology work
continued in FY2002 and FY2003 ($49 million and $25 million respectively).  In the
FY2004 budget, SBL work was folded into the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA’s)
technology budget and was not identified separately.  An MDA spokesperson reports that
there is no SBL funding requested in FY2005.
The FY2002 budget request also included funds for BMDO to resume work on space-
based kinetic energy (KE)  weapons: $5 million for experiment design and $15 million for
concept definition, but Congress cut $10 million.  The FY2003 request of $54 million was
approved in the FY2003 DOD appropriations act (P.L. 107-248), but cut by $21.3 million
in the authorization act (P.L. 107-314).  In FY2004, the space-based KE interceptor effort
IB92011 10-21-04
CRS-12
was folded into the overall BMD interceptors line and was not identified separately.
Congress cut the BMD interceptors program by $182 million in the FY2004 DOD
appropriations act (P.L. 108-87),  leaving $119 million. The Senate included language in its
version of the FY2004 DOD authorization bill (S. 1050,  Sec. 225) requiring specific
congressional authorization for using funds to design, develop, or deploy hit-to-kill
interceptors or other weapons for placement in space, and authorizing $14 million for
research and concept definition for a space-based test bed.  The conference report (H.Rept.
108-354) did not include that language, noting that the conferees understood that MDA had
no plans to use any FY2004 funding for space-based interceptors.  For FY2005, $11 million
was requested for a space-based KE interceptor “test bed” under the BMD System
Interceptor line.  The authorization and appropriation bills cut funds from that line item, but
do not specify if they are to come from the test bed. 
NFIRE.  For FY2005, MDA requested $68 million for the Near Field Infrared Sensor
(NFIRE) satellite; $44 million was appropriated for FY2004.  Scheduled for launch in
FY2006, NFIRE, as originally designed, would carry a sensor to make observations of
missile exhaust plumes to enable future sensors to distinguish between the body of a missile
and its plume.  The main NFIRE satellite would make its own observations, and, during one
part of the mission, eject a kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) carrying another sensor.  A missile
would be launched towards the KKV, and the KKV was to fly-by the missile to collect
imagery from a very close (sub-meter) position.  DOD indicated that the KKV might impact
the missile.  Data gathered by the sensors on the main satellite and on the KKV would be
applicable to any boost-phase missile defense system, whether ground-, sea-, or space-based.
Because the KKV might impact the missile, however, some view NFIRE as a test of a space-
based weapon.  As noted above, the Senate included language in the FY2004 DOD
authorization bill requiring specific congressional authorization for using funds to design,
develop, or deploy hit-to-kill interceptors or other weapons for placement in space.  The
Senate Armed Services Committee report on the FY2005 DOD authorization bill
(S.Rept.108-260) directed that, if NFIRE proceeded, it be conducted such that there is no
impact between the sensor and the missile because of space debris concerns.  The companion
House report, and the conference report, did not include similar language. The House
appropriations bill (H.R. 4613) zeroed NFIRE.  The Senate appropriations bill report
(S.Rept. 108-284) showed the $68 million for NFIRE in brackets;  DOD referred to the
money as being fenced (which typically means that it could not be spent until certain
conditions are met).  The conference report (H.Rept. 108-622) zeroed NFIRE specifically,
but included a fenced line item for $68 million labeled “Near Field Infrared Experiments.”
Antisatellite Weapons and Space Control.   DOD has a long standing interest
in developing capabilities to protect U.S. satellite systems and to deny the use of space to
adversaries.  For many years, antisatellite (ASAT) weapons designed to attack other satellites
in orbit were viewed as the primary means for denying the use of space to adversaries.  More
recently, the term “space control” has come into use.  Although ASATs are one means of
space control, the latter term includes other methods of denying the use of space to
adversaries, such as jamming satellite command links, or destroying ground control and
launch infrastructure.  One disadvantage of ASAT weapons is that they may create debris
that could damage other satellites.  In  2001, the then-Commander in Chief of U.S. Space
Command expressed reservations about using “kinetic energy” ASATs because of the
collateral damage that could be inflicted on U.S. government and commercial satellites
(Aerospace Daily, March 29, 2001).
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An Air Force ASAT development program, using F-15 based interceptors, was
terminated in the 1980s because of limitations set by Congress on testing the system.  An
Army ground-based kinetic-energy ASAT (KEAsat) program was later initiated, but was
terminated by the Clinton Administration in 1993 ( although technology studies continued).
DOD has not requested KEAsat funding since then, focusing on other space control methods.
Congress has supported DOD budget requests for space control technology funding, but also
revived the KEAsat program in FY1996, adding $30 million that year, $50 million in
FY1997, $37.5 million in FY1998, $7.5 million in FY2000, and $3 million in FY2001.
None was added in FY2002 or FY2003, but in FY2004, Congress added $4 million in the
DOD authorization act (P.L. 108-136), and $7.5 million in the FY2004 DOD appropriations
act (P.L. 108-87).  The $7.5 million was added to MDA’s “ballistic missile defense
technology” budget; MDA transferred the funds to the Army.  No KEAsat funds are
requested for FY2005 and it does not appear that any were added by Congress.
Funding for space control in the Air Force RDT&E budget continues, and since FY2003
has been augmented by funding for “counterspace systems” that support transition of some
space control activities into the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase.
In FY1999, Congress added $15 million for space control, and allowed some of the $37.5
million allocated to KEAsat to be spent on space control.  Congress added $3 million to the
$9.8 million requested for space control technology for FY2000;  approved the $9.7 million
requested for FY2001; approved $32.3 million of the $33 million requested for FY2002;
approved the $13.8 million space control request for FY2003 and the $40 million requested
for the new “counterspace systems” line item; and, in FY2004, approved the request of
$14.7 million for space control, and $82.6 million for counterspace systems.  
The FY2005 request was $15 million for space control, and $76 million for
counterspace systems.  In the  FY2005 DOD authorization bill (H.R. 4200), the House fully
funded those activities, while the Senate added $5 million for counterspace systems,
specifying that it be used for  a space control test capabilities system.  Authorization
conferees followed the action of the appropriations committees — in the FY2005 DOD
appropriations act (P.L. 108-287), space control is fully funded, but there is a  net cut of $50
million from counterspace systems, leaving $26 million.  The reduction comprises a cut of
all $53 million from the Counter Surveillance Reconnaissance System (the Senate report
stated that the Air Force had decided to terminate the program), and an addition of $3.5
million for the space control test capabilities system.
NRO, NIMA/NGA, and Imagery.   Another aspect of national security space
activities involves the NRO.  Revelations beginning in 1995 about poor financial
management at NRO led to a review by a panel chaired by retired Admiral David Jeremiah.
The 1997 Jeremiah report made 47 recommendations.  Some were adopted while others were
referred for further study.  In response to continuing concerns, the FY2000 intelligence
authorization act (P.L. 106-120) established a National Commission on the Review of the
National Reconnaissance Office.  That Commission’s 2000 report found that NRO requires
the personal attention of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central
Intelligence and must remain a strong, separate activity focused on innovation, and that
without such support, significant intelligence failures could result. 
In the late 1990s, recognizing that future budgets could be constrained, NRO adopted
the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) plan calling for developing more, smaller, less
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expensive intelligence collection satellites.  Boeing is the prime contractor.  In the conference
report on the FY2003 intelligence authorization bill (H.Rept. 107-789), Congress expressed
deep concern about the FIA, and press reports indicated that the program continued to
encounter technical and cost challenges.  The Washington Post (September 6, 2003, p. E1)
quoted an NRO spokesman as saying that $4 billion was added to the program in January
2003.  The New York Times (December 4, 2003, p. 1) reported that the original cost estimate
for the program was $6 billion, and the additional $4 billion was taken from “other spy
programs.”  The May 2003 DSB/AFSAB report, cited earlier, concluded that FIA was
“significantly underfunded and technically flawed” (p. 7).  The August 2004 update said that
FIA had made more progress than expected in resolving technical problems, but continues
to need close monitoring. 
DOD and the intelligence community augment the data provided by NRO systems with
commercial imagery (discussed earlier).  The 2003 Bush Administration policy on
commercial remote sensing directed government agencies to use commercial imagery to the
maximum extent possible.  In October 2003 and September 2004, NIMA/NGA awarded
$500 million contracts each to DigitalGlobe and Orbimage to build new satellites with 0.5
meter resolution and give NIMA priority access to the imagery at a discounted price.
Space-Based Radar. The FY2001 DOD appropriations  (P.L. 106-259) and
authorization (P.L. 106-398) acts terminated the Air Force-NRO-Army Discoverer II
program that was to demonstrate the ability of radar satellites to track mobile (as opposed to
fixed) targets on the ground.  Instead, $30 million was provided to NRO to develop and
mature technologies for such a purpose.  Concerns included whether technology was
sufficiently mature; the potential cost of an operational system (the House Appropriations
Committee estimated it at $25 billion); and whether DOD could use all the resulting data.
For FY2002, Congress appropriated $25 million for Space Based Radar (SBR) development
instead of the $50 million requested.  For FY2003, it approved the $48 million requested in
the Air Force RDT&E account, but did not approve another $43 million requested in the
Defense Emergency Response Fund.  For  FY2004, Congress appropriated $174 million, a
cut of  $100 million.  
The FY2005 request was $328 million.  The FY2005 DOD appropriations act (P.L. 108-
287) cut $253 million and directed that the remaining $75 million be used to develop
technologies and concepts that would significantly reduce program costs.  The House report
(H.Rept. 108-553) included extensive discussion of SBR that echoed what the committee
wrote in its FY2001 report.   The House and Senate included full funding for SBR in their
versions of the FY2005 DOD authorization bill (H.R. 4200), but in conference, paralleled
the action on the appropriations bill and cut $253 million.  A June 2004 Defense Science
Board report (Contributions of Space Based Radar to Missile Defense,
[http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports.htm#2004]) concluded that SBR could make substantial
contributions to missile defense.  A July 2004 GAO report (GAO-04-759) concluded that
DOD needs more knowledge about various SBR issues before proceeding with the program.
Developing New Space Launch Vehicles
Government and private sector launch vehicles are discussed in CRS Issue Brief
IB93062.  Briefly, a 1994 Clinton Administration policy directive gave NASA primary
responsibility for maintaining the reusable space shuttle and developing new reusable launch
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vehicles (RLVs), while DOD is responsible for expendable launch vehicles (ELVs).   Private
sector companies also are developing new launch vehicles.   Launch services are offered by
governments or companies in the United States, Europe, Russia, China, Ukraine (actually a
U.S.-Russian-Ukrainian-Norwegian joint venture), and India.
NASA began its attempts to develop a new RLV to replace the space shuttle in the
1980s that would cost less and improve safety.  Several programs were started and later
abandoned (NASP, X-33, and X-34).  Following President Bush’s January 2004
announcement of new exploration goals,  NASA terminated its most recent program, the
Space Launch Initiative (SLI).  The new exploration initiative involves sending astronauts
back to the Moon, but NASA officials say they do not know whether a new launch vehicle
is needed .  No money is requested for such a vehicle in NASA’s FY2005-2009 budget, but
the “sand chart” includes a projected budget estimate of $13-16 billion in the years FY2011-
2020 for a new launch vehicle.  No further details are available at this time.
DOD pursued the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program to upgrade
U.S. expendable launch vehicles to reduce launch costs by at least 25%.  Lockheed Martin
and Boeing each built EELVs, the Atlas V and the Delta IV, which are now in operation.
The companies and DOD shared the development costs, although the companies now are
seeking additional funds from DOD  because of a downturn in the forecast for commercial
launch services that had been expected to be a source of revenue.  DOD has been supportive
of industry’s position, asserting that by ensuring the health of both companies, it will have
“assured access to space” should technical problems arise with one of the vehicles.  DOD
notified Congress in 2004 that the EELV program breached the “Nunn-McCurdy” limit of
25% cost growth, which required DOD to cancel or restructure the program, or certify that
it is essential to national security.  In April 2004, DOD certified that the program is essential
for national security.   The White House, Congress, and DOD are now reconsidering whether
maintaining both EELVs is affordable.  See CRS Issue Brief IB93062.
Several private companies are attempting to develop their own launch vehicles,
although market conditions make it difficult to raise financing.  One focus today is building
suborbital launch vehicles that would take passengers into space (though not to orbit).  The
first successful launch of a person into space on a craft (SpaceShipOne) that was developed
with private capital was conducted on June 21, 2004 (discussed earlier).
Commercial Space and Trade Issues
Commercial space launch issues are discussed in CRS Issue Brief IB93062.  Briefly,
the role of the government in encouraging the growth of commercial space businesses either
by direct or indirect subsidies, or policies that help stave off foreign competitors, continues
to be debated.  Some argue that the government provides indirect subsidies to launch services
companies by allowing them to use government launch sites at nominal costs and providing
a guaranteed market for a certain number of launches.  Others insist that the U.S. government
is doing no more than foreign governments.
The main competitors to U.S. companies are Europe, Russia, and Ukraine (Ukraine’s
Zenit launch vehicle is used for the international Sea Launch joint venture that also includes
Boeing, Russia’s Energia, and Norway’s Kvaerner).  China was a competitor in the 1990s,
but its commercial launch services are suspended because the United States has not approved
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satellite exports to China for several years due to concern that China was gaining militarily
useful information.  Most of the satellites that require launches are built in the United States
or contain U.S. components, meaning export licenses are needed.  Concerns that China
acquired militarily useful information by launching U.S.-built satellites  resulted in new U.S.
laws and regulations to ensure such technology or information is not transferred.  U.S.
aerospace industry representatives argue the new regulations are hurting U.S. satellite
manufacturing companies because customers may choose non-U.S. companies to build
satellites rather than deal with U.S. export laws. (See CRS Issue Brief IB93062.)  As
discussed, another commercial space issue concerns the sale of commercial remote sensing
data with very good resolution. At issue is how to allow U.S. companies to compete in this
market without sacrificing national security interests.
International Relationships
The shifting world political situation has allowed new relationships to evolve in
international space cooperation.  Increased cooperation is the result not only of changed
political circumstances, but also of constrained budgets throughout the world.  All the major
space-faring countries are questioning how much they should invest in space.  The same
budget constraints may preclude the initiation of new programs if a critical mass of funding
is not available.  Other countries are responding cautiously to President Bush’s invitation to
join in the new exploration initiative.  Some of the partners in the International Space Station
program say they want that program completed before discussing further cooperation.
LEGISLATION
P.L. 108-287, H.R. 4613
FY2005 DOD appropriations bill.  H.R. 4613 reported from House Appropriations
Committee June 18, 2004 (H.Rept. 108-553); passed House June 22.  S. 2559 reported from
Senate Appropriations Committee June 24 (S.Rept. 108-284); passed Senate June 24.
Conference report (H.Rept. 108-622) passed House and Senate July 22.  Signed into law
August 5, 2004.
H.R. 4200 (Hunter)
FY2005 DOD authorization bill.   H.R. 4200 reported from House Armed Services
Committee May 14, 2004 (H.Rept. 108-491); passed House May 20.   S. 2400 reported from
Senate Armed Services Committee May 11, 2004 (S.Rept. 108-260); passed Senate June 23.
Conference report (H.Rept. 108-767) passed House and Senate October 9, 2004.
H.R. 5041 (Walsh)/S. 2825 (Bond)
FY2005 VA-HUD-IA appropriations (includes NASA). Reported from House
Appropriations Committee September 9, 2004 (H.Rept. 108-674). Reported from Senate
Appropriations Committee September 21, 2004 (S.Rept. 108-353).
 S. 2541 (McCain)
FY2005-2009 NASA authorization bill.  Ordered reported from the Senate Commerce,
Science, and Transportation Committee September 22, 2004.
